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The Os motic Self and Language Arts Pedagogy 
Kristie S. Fleckenstein 
D espite the influence of constructionist orientations in educational philoso­phy, mainstream American pedagogy continues to conceptualize identity and 
development predominantly as the individual or autonomous self. Evolving out 
of Cartesian rationalism, the autonomous self is one in  which ego boundaries are 
perceived as rigid and mature individual consciousness is understood as detached, 
isolated, and essentialized. Thus, the idea of an autonomous self implies a 
reality that separates facts from values, privileges scientific detachment, and 
justifies the domination of nature (Berman, 1 98 1 ;  Keller, 1 985/ 1 995) . Learning 
based on an autonomous model focuses on mastery. Meaning-making is centered 
on separation-separating the subject/text from the writer, the writer from the 
reader. Writing and reading are taught as a process of decontextualizing writers 
and readers so that they can envision a rhetorical situation as separate from self. 
Students are trained to organize the elements of their particular rhetorical situa­
tion in a manner best suited to achieving an individually conceived goal. In view 
of the social nature of all learning, the i solation of an autonomous student is in 
itself troubling. But even more disturbing is that school curricula and methodol­
ogy based on the mastery model of autonomy tend to disadvantage young girls 
and reinforce limiting stereotypes for young boys. Educators need to evolve 
language arts pedagogy that privileges an osmotic, rather than an autonomous, 
view of self. 
The Osmotic Self 
In The Reenchantment of the World, Morris Berman ( 1 98 1 ) ,  an historian of 
science, charts the historical and cultural significance in Western society of the 
osmotic or participatory self, one in which the ego boundaries are permeable. 
The idea of an osmotic self, evolving out of animistic beliefs during preHomeric 
Greece, flourished in Europe until after the Middle Ages and the reign of 
alchemy. From an osmotic perspective, self and other are perceived as physically 
or somatically linked, as manifested, for instance, in the medieval doctrine of 
signatures. During the Middle Ages people believed that eating walnuts enhanced 
mental abilities because of the physical resemblance between the nutmeat and 
the human brain. Likewise, mining for minerals was perceived as invading the 
earth's womb, so the process was treated cautiously, with respect and reverence. 
Reality that now seems outside of self was, then, physically linked to the self. 
Eventually,  in the w ake of cul tural movements culminating in C artesian 
rationalism, the osmotic self and its world view virtually disappeared from 
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Western society. Berman argues that to counter current ills , both cultural and 
individual pathologies, we need a twentieth century manifestation of osmotic 
consciousness. That consciousness builds on the somatic nature of knowing­
knowing that takes place at least initially on a physical or visceral level-and the 
interconnectedness of all things . 
A twentieth-century osmotic self and consciousness imply a holistic reality. 
In an osmotic reality, a thing (or a self) can be and not be at the same time. In  
fact, it usually is .  So an osmotic reality i s  guided not  by the l inear, critical logic 
characteristic of modern scientific thought and ego autonomy (Keller, 1985/ 1 995), 
but by a sophistic dialectical reasoning in which opposing concepts (men/women, 
love/hate, up/down) are simultaneously the same as reflected in the alchemical 
symbol of the hermaphrodite. Reali ty/knowledge/self is first a process of 
embedding or situating, then a process of categorizing or creating taxonomies. 
Because reality itself is paradoxical, knowing by accepted means-i .e. ,  the 
rationalism and empiricism privileged in Western culture-can only be partial, 
especially if the preferred tool to mediate reality is language . More highly 
textured, multileveled knowing results from the "union of subject and object, in 
a psychic-emotional identification with images rather than a purely intellectual 
examination of concepts" (Berman, 1 98 1 ,  p .  73). Knowledge, Berman contends, 
is  initially imagistic, not conceptual, so reality is  mediated imagistical ly, as well 
as linguistically. Plato's attack on preHomeric animism, the root of osmotic 
consciousness, was heavily linguistic in nature, Berman argues , an effort to 
substitute a conceptual discourse for an imagistic one (pp. 73, 1 05). The ratio­
nalists' attack on alchemy-the medieval equivalent of the preHomeric animistic 
world view-was also linguistically based. But, regardless of the historical 
efforts to oust imagery as a means to construct knowledge, imagery is currently 
reemerging as an essential mode of coding reality (Paivio, 1 986;  Sadoski & 
Paivio, 1 994). 
Creating reality/knowledge/self through "a psychic-emotional identification 
with i mages" (Berman, 1 98 1 ,  p. 73) requires that as knowers we strive to merge 
with the thing to be known-to identify with it psychically and emotionally. We 
do not, as Descartes urged, separate ourselves from the thing to be known. We 
construct world and self-consciousness through a transaction with an other that 
is perceived as not self, but knowable only when penetrated by self. We and the 
world are what Berman ( 1 989) calls a selfother, and the paradoxical reality en­
sues from the selfother fusion. From this  view, we do not dominate in order to 
learn ; we permeate. Thus ,  any rhetorical act-reading, writing, l isten ing, 
speaking (and, according to poststructural ists, being) in itially arises out of 
empathic identification with a reader, writer, or text world as an other which is  
knowable by the osmosis  of self: a selfother. Neither readerly nor writerly iden­
tity disappears in this process. We do not lose self in the process of knowing 
other; we lose consciousness of self. Ego awareness disappears in  the act of 
knowing. Similarly, meaning is not reified or commodified as an entity to be 
possessed. Instead, meaning is  something to be experienced emotionally and 
psychically, as well as intellectually. One manifestation of osmotic conscious­
ness  in read i n g  and wri t ing  i s  the exper ience  of i m m e r s i o n ,  when 
self-consciousness disappears in the doing and all that remains is  the absorption 
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in that doing. '  So, from an osmotic stance, we initially learn for the joy the 
process of knowing (or writing or reading) brings us,  not merely because we wish 
to take something away from the learning. The joy is primary, the taking away 
secondary. 
The osmotic self holds the potential to address  problems,  especially 
concerning gender identity, created in our school systems by an over-reliance on 
the mastery model of education. 
The Mastery Model and Gender 
American school curricula, structured with traditional pedagogical tech­
niques, emphasize autonomous, competitive learning aimed at mastery of a body 
of knowledge or set of skills, what Harry S. Broudy ( 1977) calls "what and how 
learning". The goal of the mastery model is to create citizens possessing the quali­
ties Western soc iety deems desirable: rationality, analytical abilities, intellectu­
alism, and independence. Humanists argue that such an agenda is laudable, 
serving Western culture's best interests. However, if we examine its implications 
for young girls and boys, we can uncover the ways in which the mastery model 
damages children. 
The general failure of the mastery model to serve young girls has been 
chronicled by Myra Sadker and David Sadker ( 1 994) in Failing at Fairness: How 
Our Schools Cheat Girls. According to them, gender bias and gender reinforce­
ment in public schools continue to privilege the intellectual and psychological 
development of young boys. Despite progress since the institution of Title IX 
legislation within public school classrooms, girls remain silenced, overlooked, 
and under instructed (Klein & Ortman, 1 994). Focusing on science education, 
Eileen Bryne ( 1995) in Women in Science: The Snark Syndrome describes the 
ways in which schools indirectly prevent girls from participating, let alone ex­
celling, in the sciences. Even our methods of teaching language awareness as 
early as preschool tend to reinscribe injurious gender practices, prevalent in the 
society at large, that disadvantage the educational development of young girls 
(Orellana, 1 995). For instance, choosing boys to make statements (i .e. ,  to answer 
questions) and girls to ask questions indirectly sets up literacy roles that frame 
boys as those who possess knowledge and girls as those who lack it. Barbara 
Guzzetti and Wayne Williams ( 1996) conclude that these gendered literacy prac­
tices are at least partially responsible for girls in high school science classes 
being informally judged as less knowledgeable than their male peers. Because 
girls asked more questions and made fewer statements than boys, they were rated 
by classmates and instructors alike as less well versed in the subject matter than 
their male counterparts. 
In addition, girls are further hindered academically by the contradictory 
messages they receive from school and the larger culture. Western thinking is 
dominated by the ideals of rationalism and ego autonomy. B ut as Andrea Nye 
( 1 988) and others have argued, Cartesian rationalism, the philosophical founda-
1 See M. Csikszentmihalyi ( 1 976, 1 993) and flow; R. Spiro ( 1 980) and reading immersion; 
L. Rosenblatt ( 1 978) and the aesthetic experience. 
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tion of the autonomous self, is a male-marked philosophy. The intellectual and 
emotional qualities valued by rationalists are those qualities marked as mascu­
line in our western culture. 2 Men are gendered as rational, intellectual, autono­
mous, and analytical (Lerner, 1 986); cultural protocols-those unwritten rules 
about how young men are supposed to act, feel, believe, and behave-and aca­
demic curricula aim at the development and reward the display of those qualities 
in all students. To achieve academic success, boys merely need to be in school as 
they have been taught to be in the culture at large. B ut girls are not so lucky. The 
West has marked as feminine those qualities deemed the antithesis of rational­
ism: intuition, integration, body mystery, nurturing and spiritual concerns. So, to 
be gendered feminine, girls are supposed to focus more on relationships than on 
autonomy, resulting in ethical stances (Noddings, 1 984), thinking processes 
(Chodorow, 1 989; Gilligan, 1 982), and spirituality (Spretnak, 1994) differing from 
those marked masculine. An inevitable outcome of such a distinction is that girls 
usually flourish in a learning environment based less on competition and mastery 
and more on cooperation and negotiation (Belenky et a! . ,  1 986)3• These qualities 
in and of themselves are not the problem. The problem for girls is that schooling, 
aimed at developing the Cartesian prototype, continues to base pedagogy on the 
competitive mastery model and assess girls '  success on the basis of their ability 
to acquire qualities culturally marked male (Flax, 1995; Guzzetti & Williams, 
1996). The school system implicitly preaches and awards autonomy, while the 
culture sends the message that girls should not be autonomous. They should not 
compete, they should not win, but to succeed in school they must do both. To win 
culturally, they must lose academically, with all the economic and social impli­
cations of that loss .  
This double bind costs girls psychologically as well as intellectually. And 
the price they pay is devastating. Adolescent girls growing up in our culture, 
spending much of their days in our academic system, lose both a sense of self 
and an esteem for self (Brown & Gilligan, 1 992; Pipher, 1 994; Sadker & Sadker, 
1 994). Behaviors such as anorexia,  bulimia, and self-mutilation indicate a 
growing pathology among adolescent girls in our Western culture. Psychothera­
pists working from a feminist perspective argue that self-destructive behavior 
among women is a direct outgrowth of the contradictory messages our culture 
sends to women. Successful therapy requires that women reeducate themselves 
21 am not trying to essentialize either men or women here. Neither women nor men are 
innately rational versus innately intuitive, etc. Culturally, however, both tend to be social­
ized into certain identities, roles, and attributes. And for women, it tends to lead them into 
devalued positions. 
3This is not to say that girls cannot flourish in an aversive learning environment. Many can 
and do. Thus, those who advocate excluding women from institutions such as the Virginia 
Military Academy and the Citadel argue from erroneous premises. If such an argument 
were true, women would not continue to succeed in academic (and military) environments 
which are already contrary to gender constraints. My concern is not with women 's suc­
cesses in the academy, military, or corporate world. My concern is with women's failures. 
Merely because women have the ability to make a poor system work for them is not 
a legitimate argument for supporting that system. 
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to counteract the cultural double bind that traps them (Mitchell, 1 992). 
Boys,  less obviously, also pay a price.  Education based on the autonomous 
self  rein forces i nj urious stereotypes,  particularly rei nscribing men in an 
oppressor's role (Keller, 1 9851 1 995, chapter 4 on the dangers of autonomy). The 
competitive and autonomous nature of the mastery model of education fosters 
the attitude that a man should master all he surveys. Control, essential to Carte­
sian rationalism, i s  the basis of the mastery model: control of mind over matter, 
man over his environment, objectivity over subjectivity. Thus, to be successful 
men, boys must win-at whatever they do. They must be on the top of the hierar­
chical structures they create, which means that in winning they end up alone at 
the top. The one in control doesn' t  share the position. In  her study of informal 
conversation, sociolinguist Deborah Tannen ( 1 990) notes that a common conver­
sational turn for men is oneupmanship. Men use conversation with other men as 
another means of competition, as a way to score points and establish ascendent 
power positions. The psychological and spiritual impoverishment of such posi­
tioning (Bly, 1 990; Keller, 1 985/ l 995), as well as  the social and environmental 
dangers (Berman, 1 9 8 1  ), is devastating to both men and culture. 
By restructuring classrooms, especially language arts classrooms that deal 
with core questions about the nature of meaning, we could help offset these 
pernicious trends.  An osmotic approach to knowledge is based on the inter­
rel ationship of all things. Knowledge is  not reified into a commodity, but 
accepted as a process of selfothering (Berman, 1 989) because we cannot know 
until we are l inked psychically and emotionally with an other. Such an approach 
emphasizes cooperation before competition, caring before mastery. 
Language Arts Pedagogy and the Osmotic Self 
Pedagogically, teaching for and with the osmotic self means teaching 
sensuously, emphas izing somatic knowing: the complex transaction of body, 
emotions, and intellect with physical implements and motion (book, pen, paper, 
keyboard, marks on the page); our physical environment; our visceral reactions 
and state of body; and the self in  the not-self of the text world. Contextualized 
within the classroom, somatic knowing might translate into two general goals: 
1) incorporation of mimesis, or constructing knowledge through identification, 
and 2) immersion, or fostering absorption in  language tasks. 
According to Eric Havelock, the major mode of instruction in preHomeric 
Greece was mimesis, where individuals identified emotionally with the speaker 
or a choru s .  In a state of autohypnosi s ,  the audience memorized the poetry 
spoken by the chorus, and knowledge was passed on by this method (as cited in  
Berman, 1 98 1 ,  pp. 72-73). The point about mimesis for our twentieth-century 
classrooms is not the memorizing of poetry, but the emotional identification of 
the learner wi th the material being learned, using language as vehicle and cata­
lyst. Learning becomes inseparable from emotional involvement. 
As teachers we need to consider mimesis from two angles: i dentification 
with our students and for our students. Transforming ourselves as teachers in the 
process of teaching must remain an integral part of osmotic learning.  To make 
our classrooms sites of transformation, we need to make our students subjects, 
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not obj ects .  Too frequently, we automatically assume that the interpretation of 
reality we bring with us into the classroom is the right one, the one shared by 
e veryone. So we uncritically i mpose that interpretation on our students and use 
the extent of our students' assimilation as a measure of their (and our) success. 
But the starting point for our pedagogy should not be our interior life ,  but that of 
our students. We can't  engage them in the reciprocity of teaching without under­
standing their interior reali ty, the reality that they believe is shared by everyone. 
Paul Cobb ( 1 990), a social constructionist in math education, argues that we all 
carry with us an expressionist,  subjectively real, vision of reality. It is both a 
Platonic reality-in that truth is experienced as inner-and an Aristotelian real­
ity-in that truth is experienced. as out there. The Aristotelian reality is our taken 
for granted reality that we share without question ( Berger, 1 969). Unfortunately, 
neither a student's Platonic nor her Aristotelian reality necessarily matches ours. 
To even begin teaching, we must e ngage in mimesis. We need to know our 
students' realities,  and, thus, know how those realities d iverge from our own. We 
need to stand i n  the ir shoes, or, as Scout Fi nch does,  stand on the ir front porch 
and experience the world through the ir eyes. We need to sit in their worlds and 
l isten so that we hear their hopes, pressures, fears, and values. Such a position is 
by its nature transformative. By i de ntifying with the ir worlds we inevitably 
change our perceptions of our worlds; our starting point as teachers shifts. So if 
we suffer the hubris of wishing to change their world views, we are obligated to 
transform our own, learning first hand how that proc e s s  undermines and 
challenges everything we hold dear. 
For our students,  we need to help them l earn m i metically,  fo ster i n g  
identification i n  their interactions w i t h  the world. T h e  "route t o  true understand­
ing is to be found in absorption, in the loss of psychic distance," Berman says 
( 1 989, p. 1 12).  "Who knows more about medieval sainthood-the historian who 
compiles data on age and nationality, or the one who goes to a monastery and sits 
in a c e l l  for several months" ( p .  1 1 5) .  T h e  major goal of a partic ipatory 
classroom is to help our students d i ssolve that psychic distance, achieve the 
selfother state through the temporary loss of self consciousness. Part of the 
answer may lie in encouraging empathy. 
Psychologist Martin Hoffman ( 1 984) claims that empathy, the sensation of 
experiencing another person's feelings or reactions, at its most sophistic ated, i s  
achieved through either a self focus or a n  other focus. With a s e l f  focus, w e  
picture ourselves in another person's place and imagine the situation as i f  we 
were personally experiencing it (p. 1 1 7) .  With an other focus we v isualize an­
other person 's situation and responses, imagine how he or she is feeling, and 
respond as if  we were there actually observing the action. With both methods, 
our awareness of o u r  own ego consciousness is reduced (although our ego 
identity re mains intact); we identify with the other. S uch empathic identification 
is the key to aesthetic reading (Poulet, 1 980) , teacher-student interactions 
(McLeod, 1 995 ) , and various writing c hoices (Teich, 1 994 ). 
Barbara McClintock offers an example of the power of empathic learning . 
As described by Keller ( 1983)  in A Feeling for the Organism, McClintock, Nobel 
laureate in corn genetics,  evolved her revolutionary theory of transposition (the 
idea that genetic structures change in response to the ambient environment of the 
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plant) by developing an intimacy for the plants she was studying. As Keller, para­
phrasing and quoting McCl intock, describes, we "mus t  have the time to look, the 
patience to 'hear what the material has to say to you , '  the openness to ' let it 
come to you.' Above all, one must have a ' feeling for the organism"' (p. 1 98) .  
McClintock's ability to see complexity missed by her fellow plant geneticists 
was a direct outgrowth of her intimate knowledge of her subjects. McClintock's 
feel ing for the organism, Keller says, reflects a desire to "embrace the world in 
its very being, through reason and beyond" (pp. 1 98- 1 99) .  Such a desire y ielded 
a "sympathetic understanding" (p. 200) in which self awareness was subsumed 
in the emotional-intellectual fusion of identification. In a flight of poetic fancy, 
McClintock says that she feel s  sorry when she walks on grass because she knows 
that the "grass is screaming at me" (as cited in Keller, 1 983 ,  p. 200). 
The second goal-immersion-is an outgrowth of the first .  We need to teach 
so that students experience flow. According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi ( 1 976), 
a psychologist who has studied the exhilaration of "pleasure pursuits" for over 
20 years, flow i s  a subjective state in which the actor is completely absorbed in 
her actions: 
[A]ction follows upon action according to an internal logic that 
seems to need no conscious i ntervention by the actor. He [sic] 
experiences i t  a s  a unified flowing from one moment to the next, in 
which he i s  in control of his actions, and in which there is little 
distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and 
response, or between past, present, and future. (p. 36) 
Without  flow exper i e n c e s  in  t h e  c l as s room in t h e  pro c e s s  of l earn i n g ,  
Csikszentmihalyi argues, children work for the grade, not for the learning itself, 
thus gradually coming to believe that the work itself i s  negligible; only the grade 
is important. When the extrinsic reward (or threat) of the grade is removed, i .e.,  
after graduation, there is no motivation to continue learning. However, with flow, 
learning becomes a l ifelong endeavor. 
Flow e xperien c e s  can oc c u r  a n y w h ere at a n y t i m e  d o i n g  a n y t h i n g  
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1976); they are n o t  l imited t o  pleasurable activities. We can 
experience flow mopping the floor, mowing the lawn, or making puzzles with 
our children. Likewise, flow can become an integral part of our c lassroom meth­
odology. I n  The Evolving Self: A Psychology for the Third Millennium, 
Csikszentmihalyi ( 1 993) describes the characteristics of a "flow personality," a 
person who has learned to control consciousness in such a way that flow experi­
ences become a way of l ife .  For instance, 1 )  they can match their skills to their 
opportunities; 2) they set doable goals; 3) they are sensitive to the feedback from 
the activity;  4) they concentrate easily;  and 5 )  they don't fear losing their 
self-awareness or self-consciousness. 
We can help our students develop these flow characteristics i n  reading and 
writing by helping them match current abilities to opportunities (i .e. ,  Vygotsky 's 
zone o f  proximal development), by helping them set personal goals (instead of 
merely instantiating institutional goals for writing and reading), by helping them 
develop metacognitive and reflective monitoring (Brown, 1994), by helping them 
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learn how to concentrate (as a mother of preschoolers I have discovered that this 
is a tough proposition), and by seeing that loss of self awareness is not a loss of 
self. Part of the answer may lie in asking students to examine flow experiences 
outside the classroom, writing narratives of those experiences-engaging in what 
Britton ( 1 989) calls "constructive reflection," and trying to incorporate the 
resulting insights into their language activities. Another strategy may rest with 
helping s tudents evoke mental imagery both as they read and as they write. 
In reading, Mark Sadoski, Ernest Goetz, and Susan Kangiser ( 1 985) suggest the 
connection between the evocation of mental imagery and emotional interaction 
with an evolving text world, while my work ( 1 99 1 ;  1 993) in writing correlates 
mental imagery to text engagement and writing frequency in proficient and un­
der prepared college writers. The possibilities are legion, and the potential of 
flow worth our effort. 
Beyond Pedagogy 
Classroom and world implicate each other. How we create self and reality in 
our classrooms will automatically impinge on our students ' self and reality 
outside of the classroom.  So an interiority and a world view arising out of 
identification, selfothering, and flow holds the potential of transforming our so­
cial reality. It is difficult to lash out-physically and emotionally-at an other 
when we define self by means of other, when self and other interpenetrate. When 
we conceive of self and reality as a web of being, as well as a web of meaning, 
we will inevitably be more careful about maintaining the fragile threads that 
constitute and bind us. Basing our language arts pedagogy on the osmotic self 
may be one way we can preserve our children's well-being and preserve the world 
for our children. i2l 
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